The Battle of Pelusion, 170 BC

Also referred to on occasion as the Battle of Mount Casios, this battle pitted the army of Ptolemaic Egypt against the army of Seleukid Syria. According to Polybius (27.19), Antiochos IV Epiphanes, having only become king a few years previously, grew concerned that the Egyptians would soon attempt to retake Koile Syria. The Ptolemies had lost control of Phoenicia and Palestine, which together constituted much of the larger region called Koile Syria, in about 200 BC. In that year Antiochos the Great had utterly defeated a Ptolemaic army at Panion in Koile Syria, and the Seleukids had controlled the region ever since.

Phoenicia and Palestine, which by 170 had been controlled by the Seleucids for 30 years, had been Ptolemaic possessions for the entire third century. From about 175 some of the First Friends and others in the court elite of the Ptolemaic kingdom had begun planning to retake Koile Syria. The leaders in Alexandreia at this time were not the young Ptolemy VI Philometer, but his tutors Eulaios and Lenaios. They were Syrians by descent, and were not normal members of the Alexandreian court aristocracy. They had most likely come to Egypt with Ptolemy VI's mother, Kleopatra, the daughter of the former Seleukid king and the sister of Antiochos IV. They had cared for the young Ptolemy when was a child, and became his regents after his mother died.

Eulaios and Lenaios have long been blamed for instigating the war against the Seleukids. The tradition dates back at least as far as Polybius. While it is true that they commanded the army at the battle of Pelusion, scholars have too quickly vilified them as "easterners” driving a wedge between the fading remnants of Hellenic political-military power. In fact, court intrigue and the Alexandrian mob likely drove their planning, and if they had not begun preparing to lead the army to war, surely one of the many Ptolemaic generals and aristocrats that flooded into Alexandria in 175/4 would have been more than willing.

The Ptolemaic army marshaled at Pelusion, off the eastern edge of the Delta, on the main highway to Syria. Pelusion was and would remain the primary fortification on the eastern boundary of Egypt, and was one of the largest garrison sites in the entire Ptolemaic empire. Historians of the early twentieth century enjoyed styling the forthcoming battle as one between the Seleukid Greeks and the Ptolemaic Egyptians, drawing the ethnicity of the armies from the Hellenizing character of Antiochus implied by ancient sources and by the “eastern” descent of the Ptolemaic tutors-turned-generals. This simply would not have been the case.

The Ptolemaic army preparing to invade Koile Syria would have had a good bit in common with the army that fought at Raphia in 217, and even more with the army that fought at Panion in 200/199. In addition to imported mercenaries, elite units from Alexandreia, and the standing army garrison at Pelusion, the Egyptian commanders would likely have drawn from their forces in the upper Delta region (around Memphis) and from the Fayum and its vicinity. From these areas they could have recruited several thousand Hellenic cavalrymen of varying qualities and several thousands of Hellenes and Egyptians for their respective phalanxes. Additionally, after the end of the major Egyptian rebellion in 186, as many as eight thousand new soldiers had been given medium-infantry land allotments in the Arsinoite and Herakleopolite nomes. These soldiers, who likely fought as thureophoroi or thorakitai, likely faced their first major test against Hellenistic forces in the battle at Pelusion. Altogether, the Ptolemaic army, raised to defeat the Seleukids and recover all or most of Koile Syria, could have reasonably numbered three thousand or more cavalry, as many as forty thousand locally-recruited line infantry, and—counting the mercenaries garrisoned at Pelusion and those who would have accompanied the army to garrison captured strongpoints—ten to twenty thousand mercenaries and newly-recruited local light infantry.

The most significant element in the Ptolemaic army at Pelusion would likely have been the nearly eight thousand soldiers settled after the campaigns in Upper Egypt in the 180’s BC. Given that their land allotments were half the size of those given to phalangites, their armament could not have been particularly heavy, and it is most likely that they fought as thureophoroi of some sort. Now, the Ptolemaic army has been assumed to have developed thureophoroi-type soldiers in the 160’s BC as a reform of Philometer, but the Ptolemies began equipping soldiers in this style, in mimicry of their capable Galatian troops, in the aftermath of the battle of Panion, if not earlier. They were only organized in the Roman manner in the 160’s BC, but their equipment would have looked rather Roman to a modern time-traveler.

We know very little about the battle. Based on papyri, it has been dated to November 170 BC. This is an odd date, because most campaigns started in the spring, not in winter. It indicates that the Egyptians had planned to attack early in the spring of 169, so Antiochos forced the issue by attacking the Egyptians at Pelusion at the onset of the Middle Eastern winter, which aside from cultural norms would likely have been a better campaigning season anyway. The Seleukid forces likely camped on Mount Kasios, several kilometers east of Pelusion, and the two sides likely joined battle in the plain between Pelusion and the mountain, since later writers could reference the battle as that of Mount Kasios or that of Pelusion.

The limited description of the battle implies that the Seleukids achieved a double envelopment of the Ptolemaic army. This is impressive since, if the Seleukid army was roughly the size of that at the Daphne parade, it would not have outnumbered the Ptolemaic army by a very significant margin, if at all. However, it almost certainly had a decisive advantage in cavalry, which could easily have outnumbered the Ptolemaic cavalry by 3:1. While phalanxes and elephants may have slowly opened an engagement in the center, the textual evidence implies that Seleukid cavalry were successful on both wings, putting their opposition to flight and threatening to cut off the entire Ptolemaic force. Diodorus says (26.77) that at that point Antiochos rode around to his army, telling them to capture prisoners rather than slaughtering the Ptolemaic army. If such orders had only been given to his own wing it would not have been an aspect of the battle worthy of recount in Diodorus’ scanty note. And if the wings had not succeeded in some form of envelopment, riding around to other parts of his army to deliver his order for mercy would have been impossible. So what is most likely is that his cavalry wing achieved a major success, as did the cavalry complement on the other wing. Fearing that his successful forces on the wings might fall on the flanks and rear of the phalanx and kill thousands of Ptolemaic Makedonian soldiers, as apparently happened at Panion, he gave orders to his own wing to show mercy, and, riding across the rear of the out-flanked Ptolemaic phalanx, gave similar orders to cavalry on the opposite flank. The actual success Antiochus had in stopping a massacre is unclear, though the narrative in Daniel (11.26) implies that either the entire Egyptian army, or the royal contingent near the king, suffered heavy casualties.

This order was fed by Antiochos’ desires to gain some form of hegemony over all Egypt. After the decisive battle, he sought to show kindness to the Ptolemaic prince, lavished gifts on the Hellenic citizens of Naukratis, and, judging from a small fragmentary papyrus, gave similar gifts to the klerouchs, or settled reserve soldiers, of the Arsinoite nome in the Fayum. By sparing many soldiers in their defeat, and by showing them greater favors in the following months, he hoped to secure their support for his growing power in Egypt. His plan does not seem to have been spectacularly successful, for his occupation was short-lived and ended in coordinated resistance by considerable elements of the Ptolemaic military, even if there is clear papyrological evidence that some soldiers had joined his side.

Introductions

I have been encouraged by friends to begin a blog, and to publish therein some of the many stories of the ancient world with which I frequently regale them. As long as I am entertaining them with stories of epic battles, failed stratagems, and the quirks of an ancient soldier's daily life, I may as well offer that opportunity to others.

A bit about myself: I am 25 years old, a native of Georgia, and only recently engaged to be married. I am a graduate student in ancient and military history, and now, entering my fourth year of the program, I am planning my dissertation. I am most interested in the Hellenistic period, and much of my work focuses on the Ptolemies of Egypt. Thus their history, and Hellenistic history, are likely to appear most frequently.

As for content, I am planning several components. First, whenever some story I have saved away comes out in conversation, I'll plan to elaborate on it here. That was the original germ for this blog. You may as well think of it as " But I will also be including a few "features" as regularly as I can manage. The first is a "This Day in Ancient Warfare," which is likely self-explanatory, and the second is "Makariamachy," which probably is not. "Makariamachy" means, roughly translated, the battle against foolishness. It will be an opportunity to examine battles, institutions, equipment, and people that are frequently oversimplified, misunderstood, or mistreated. At some point I would also like to add a feature for the "Unheard-of Ancient Battles," and its entirely possible I'll also post-in some of my thoughts on my research as I go along.